Introduction
In this article the general
provisions
u/ss. 273A, 273B, 274 and 275 have been covered.
Scope of power to reduce or waiver
of penalty under section 273a of the Income-tax Act
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Scope of power
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The present section
273A was inserted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975
with effect from 1-10-1975. This is a successor to section
271(4A). section 273A after its introduction in 1978 has been
truncated considerably as many of the sub-sections have been
omitted because of the amendment of several other sections
notably the introduction of interest u/s. 234A,B and C in
place of interest u/s. 139 (8), section 215, 217. Presently
there is no power u/s. 273A to reduce or waive interest unlike
the case for the corresponding interest u/s. 215, 217 and
139(8) in respect of which the omitted sub-sections (i) and
(iii) contained a power to waive those interest. These sub-sections
have been omitted w.e.f. 1-4-1989 with the introduction of
sections 234A, 234B and 234C which are construed as authorizing
a mandatory levy of interest. Thus there is no power under
section 273A to waive or reduce these interests. It is to
be noted that there is a limited power given to the Commissioner
under the circumstances spelt out in the CBDT circular but
that is de hors section 273A.
- Penalty for concealment
Sub-section 1 of section
273A of the Income-tax Act has delegated to the Commissioner,
the power to waive penalty or reduce the penalty imposed or
imposable on a person under clause (iii) of sub-section (1)
of section 271. This penalty that is leviable under sec.271(I)(iii)
is penalty for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing
of inaccurate particulars of income. The quantum of penalty
leviable is minimum 100% and maximum 300% of the tax sought
to be evaded.
- Commissioner has the
power to waive on his own motion or otherwise
- A plain reading of sub-section 1 of section
273A suggests that the Commissioner may exercise the power at
his discretion, either on his own motion or otherwise. This
is a departure from the erstwhile section 271(4A) where the
words ‘on his own motion’ were absent.
- Assessee liable
for concealment penalty can make a waiver application
The word ‘otherwise’ denotes
that it is the assessee who makes the application for waiver
or reduction of the said penalty because it is that assessee
or person who has to make a full and true disclosure of the
particulars of income that were in the first instance concealed
or furnished inaccurately. This application can be made either
before the penalty is imposed or after it is imposed. There
is no period of limitation for making such an application.
India Co. vs. CIT 122 ITR 510 (Raj.).
- No prescribed
form – single application for several years-valid
There is no prescribed form
for making this application. The application can be for a
single year or for a number of years for which the assessee
comes forward to make a full and true disclosure of income
which had not been disclosed originally.
It is clear from a reading
of sub-clause (b) of Clause 2 of section 273A that the application
can be made for several assessment years and the disclosure
must be then for those several assessment years. Single
application can be made for several asst. years (Subramani
vs. Asst. 202 ITR 347 (Karnataka)
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Precondition to be strictly
complied with
However there are other conditions
precedent which cannot be dispensed with and which have to
be strictly complied with and which are as follows:
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As provided for in sub-clause
(b) of clause (ii) of sub-section (I) of section 273A,
the Commissioner must be satisfied that such person.
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has prior to detection
by the Assessing Officer of the concealment of particulars
of income or of the inaccuracy of particulars furnished
of such income.
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has voluntarily
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and in good faith
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made full and
true disclosure of such particulars.
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It is thus a prerequisite
that there must be a full and true disclosure made
voluntarily in good faith and prior to detection by
the Assessing Officer.
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Another precondition
stipulated after sub-clause (b) is that the assessee
has cooperated in any enquiry relating to the
assessment of his income.
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The assessee has
made satisfactory arrangement for the payment of
any tax or interest payable pursuant to the Assessment
Order.
- Clarificatory explanation
There is an important statutory
explanation contained in sub-section 1 of section 273A. A person
shall be deemed to have made a disclosure of his income or all
the particulars relating to such income even in a case where the
income assessed is higher than the income returned provided that
the excess addition is of a nature which does not attract the
provisions of Clause (c) of sub-section 1 of section 271.
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Monetary limit over
which Chief Commissioner’s approval required
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Sub-clause (b) of Clause
2 of section 273 provides that where the aggregate amount
of income for the years for which the disclosure is made exceeds
a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, the Commissioner cannot waive the
penalty except with the previous approval of the Chief Commissioner
or the Director General. Prior to 1-6-1993 it was the Board
which had to grant approval for waiver of penalty in a case
where the aggregate income for the year or years in question
exceeded Rs. 5,00,000/-.
- Once in a lifetime
Relief
Sub-section 3 of section 273A
stipulates that the assessee can avail of this remedy for waiver
of concealment penalty under sub-section (1) of section 273A only
once in a lifetime and thus if an order has been made in favour
of any person whether the order relates to one or more assessment
years, that person shall not be entitled to relief for any other
assessment year at any time after the making of such order. Under
the erstwhile section 271(4A) there was no limit on the number
of applications. It is, thus, a once in the lifetime relief which
has to be exercised with caution. However, on a plain reading
it is also clear that if an assessee has made an application which
was refused that would not operate as an embargo to make another
application subsequently for the other years because it is only
when relief is granted that this embargo comes into play. This
was held also in the case of Shree Singhavi Bros. vs. Union
of India 187 ITR 219 233 (Raj.).
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Commissioner to exercise discretion
judiciously if conditions are complied with
Thus once the conditions have
been satisfied the Commissioner has to pass an order for waiver
or reduction. Sub-section (4) provides that the Commissioner has
to pass an order in respect of the application made by the assessee.
The Commissioner may reduce or waive the amount of penalty payable
and he is not justified in denying the relief if conditions have
been complied with.
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Conditions to be complied with
by the assessee
- Full and True
Disclosure
This disclosure may be made
either at the time of filing initial return, or revised return
or even subsequent to the filing of the return provided that
it is prior to detection. It was held that the disclosure
can also be at the time of assessment or post assessment and
prior to issue of notice u/s. 148 in the case of Redhey
Sham Chandrika Prasad vs. CIT 139 ITR 274 (All).
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‘Prior
to detection’— meaning
The question that arises
is whether an assessee can make a disclosure after a search
under sec. 132. In the case of K.M. Radha Krishna Chettiar
& Co. vs. CIT. 244 ITR 374 (Mad) the Commissioner
had rejected the assessee’s application on the preliminary
ground that the disclosure was after a search. However the
Madras High Court quashed the Order and matter was remanded
to the Commissioner.
Under sec.273A the
applicant does not have to prove that penalty was not exigible.
The applicant claims the waiver by his conduct of having made
a full and true disclosure voluntarily and in good faith.
By demonstrating that these and other stipulated conditions
are satisfied he seeks the relief . This was the exposition
of the law as laid down in Kherunise Alibhai vs. CIT 113
ITR 443(Guj).
Jyoti Steels vs.
CIT 166 ITR 558, 564 (All).
Once the conditions
are satisfied the Commissioner is duty bound to grant waiver
or reduction.
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Assessee must act in good
faith
Good faith is synonymous
with acting honestly. The assessee should not have acted dishonestly
in making the disclosure. The fact that before making the
disclosure he had been dishonest is irrelevant and immaterial.
The fact that this section gives the assessee an opportunity
to come clear assumes that the assessee had
earlier withheld the particulars or concealed income.
The cases on the point
are :
Jakhodia Bros. vs.
CIT 115 ITR 61 (All)
K. Romuke Bros.
vs. CIT 185 ITR 517, 524 (A.P.)
Krishna Gopi vs.
P.S. Bhaskaran 161 DTR 631 (Bom.)
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Act done in good faith will
be considered to be honest even if tainted with negligence
The Bombay High Court in
the case of Laxman vs. CIT 174 ITR 465, 472 (Bom.)
has laid down that the definition of the term good faith must
be taken from the General Clauses Act as it is not defined
in the Income-tax Act. Negligence or mistake may not necessarily
detract from the honest belief of the assessee.
Similar is the ratio in the
case of
Shareef Ahmed vs.
CWT 117 ITR 35, 39 (All.)
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Belated return cannot be
said to indicate lack of good faith
The return if filed belatedly
and a disclosure if made negligently can still be considered
to be in good faith if it is done honestly.
Radhakrishna vs.
CWT 121 ITR 722 (Karn)
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Where disclosure made after
detection - assessee not entitled to waiver
Where disclosure of full
and true particulars made after detection of defective returns.
Held that assessee not entitled to benefit of relief. Ajay
Medical Agency vs. CIT 237 ITR 413(H.P.)
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Voluntarily implies free
will and an act without compulsion
Whether a disclosure made
after search is voluntary or not is a question to be decided
in each case. So it was held in the case of Mohd. Farooq
vs. CIT 230 ITR 855 (All-FB). However, when there is a
search on the assessee directly it will be difficult to suggest
that the assessee has not acted under the constraint of exposure
by the Department. However, if there is a search on some other
person wherein the assessee was connected indirectly the assessee
would be at liberty to show that it was voluntary and prior
to detection.
- The order u/s. 273A
is final and not subject to scrutiny by an Appeal Court
Section 273A(5) specifically
stipulates that the order passed u/s. 273A shall not be called
in question by any court or authority. However, this does not
place any embargo on the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This was laid down in the case
of R.P. Ramaswamy Chatraya vs. CWT 144 ITR 87 (Mad.)
It is held by the Supreme Court
that the statutory finality does not restrict jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court under Article 136 or the exercise of writ jurisdiction
by the High Courts under Article 226. Raj Krushna Bose vs.
Vinod Kalangaon AIR 1954 SC 252.
This principle was also reiterated
in the case of Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zechillhu AIR 1993 SC 412.
However, it is also clear that a writ court does not sit in appeal
against the decision of the statutory authority. The jurisdiction
of the writ court will only extend to examine the decision making
process and where the Commissioner has applied his mind, the writ
would not lie. However, as discussed above where there is non
application of mind, non compliance with rules of Natural Justice,
reliance on extraneous grounds and facts to deny relief in such
cases the Courts have admitted and allowed the writ and remanded
the matter to the Commissioner for fresh decision.
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Principles laid down by Courts
whilst exercising writ jurisdiction
The Court has held that
the discretion granted to the Commissioner to waive or reduce
penalty must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously and
the decision for exercise of discretionary powers u/s. 273A must
be exercised on objective considerations and not on any subjective
basis. The discretion cannot be construed to be an absolute discretion
to pass any order but discretion based on the merits of the application
and the compliance of the conditions. Therefore if the conditions
laid down for the exercise of discretion are satisfied the authority
has no power to refuse to exercise the discretion. This was held
in the case of KSN Murti vs. Chairman CBDT 252 ITR 269(A.P.).
It follows therefore that the order of the Commissioner must
be a speaking order with supporting reasons and any rejection
by the Commissioner of the application without supporting reasons
cannot be sustained in law. In the case of Public Carriers
Truck Owners Association vs. CIT 210 ITR 36 (Raj.)
it was laid down reasons have to be recorded as to why there is
only a partial waiver and reduction.
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Opportunity of being heard
It was held in the case
of Mr. Kanayalal (HUF) vs. CIT 247 ITR 686 (All.) that
the rules of natural justice have to be complied with by the Commissioner
while considering an application for waiver. This implies that
the assessee must be given copies of any material proposed to
be used. It should be supplied in advance to the party so that
an opportunity is given to explain the same. It is also held that
the rejection of the assessee’s application without giving the
assessee a proper opportunity of being heard is an invalid rejection.
It was held in the case of Kailash Mills vs. CIT 260 ITR 322
(All.) that if conditions mentioned in Clause (c) of section
273A(1) are satisfied some relief has to be given either as total
waiver or reduction but the application cannot be rejected totally.
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Denial of waiver unjustified
where conditions are complied with
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The Courts have, in several
cases, remanded the matter to the Commissioner for deciding
the matter a fresh where the Commissioner had reduced the
quantum of penalty although all the conditions had been complied
with. The assessees had contended in the writ petitions filed
that complete waiver ought to have been granted since all
conditions have been complied with. Some of the leading cases
in which the High Courts have intervened and remanded the
matter are listed hereinbelow.
Sardar Kartar Singh vs. CIT
135 ITR 379 (Gohati)
Vaidya Nath Sarma vs. CWT
140 ITR 801.
Prakash Devi vs. CWT 141
ITR 122.
Mohd. Ali vs. CWT 141 ITR
690 (Gauhati)
Purshotam Thacker vs. CIT
154 ITR 438 (Bom).
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Under the previous provisions
where the Commissioner reduced penalty u/s. 271(1)(a) but
did not waive penalty under 273(b) without any justification,
the High Court of Gujarat in the case of Durga Cotton Ginning
& Pressing Factory reported in 211 ITR 210 took the judicious
decision to grant the application for waiver of penalty and
interest rather than remanding the matter as 13 years had
elapsed. Similar decision was taken in the case of Vinodchander
C. Patil vs. CIT 211 ITR 232, 235 and 236 (Guj.).
- Consequences of application
being rejected
One very important issue has
been considered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of
Addl. CIT vs. Kahaiyalal Jessaaram, 106 ITR 168 (M.P.). It
has been held by the Court that where the assessee’s application
for waiver and reduction has not been acceded to the department
cannot be permitted to use the factual admissions disclosed by
the assessee against the assessee for the purpose of assessment
and especially not for the purpose of imposition of penalty.
This is a very salutary principle
laid down by the M.P. High Court and is based on the principle
that offer and acceptance constitute integral parts of the scheme
to persuade tax evaders to make a full disclosure and in good
faith. The Department must also exercise good faith in not taking
undue advantage of the disclosure made in good faith.
Similarly it is held that the
CIT’s order directing assessment based on assessee’s petition
and refusing to grant waiver on the ground that assessee had adopted
differing stands about spread over was set aside as the assessee
had complied with all conditions. Mahalakshmi Rice Mills vs.
CIT 129 ITR 53 (Karnataka).
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Settlement talks with the Commissioner
– Can it constitute estoppel
Where the CIT in the course
of an agreement with the assessee communicated that a minimum
penalty of 20% would be imposed. It was held that this amounted
to a valid and binding order of waiver. (this was under the provisions
of sec. 271(4A) which is in pari materia with sec. 273A). Fairdeal
Motors vs. CIT 101 ITR 687 (J&K).
However, where there was
an oral settlement whereby the Commissioner assured that penalty
would be imposed lower than the minimum, and the assessee defaulted
in paying the tax as agreed. Commissioner imposed minimum penalty.
It was held in this case of CIT vs. P. Nammawar Naidu, SMS,
116 ITR 863 (Mad.) that the principle of estoppel did not
apply against the statute that there must be an order by the CIT
before penalty can be reduced or waived.
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ITO’s duty to deal with penalty
matters after rejection of waiver application
In the event that the Commissioner
rejects the waiver application and the ITO is required to exercise
his jurisdiction to impose penalty it was held by the Kerala High
Court that the ITO should deal with the assessment untrammelled
by the Commissioner’s findings and observations. Associated
Traders vs. ITO 180 ITR 406 (Ker.)
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Amnesty Scheme on the jurisdiction
u/s. 273A
In a case where the assessee
had filed declarations under the Amnesty Scheme and in pursuance
to that filed a waiver application, however, no order was passed
under the Amnesty Scheme and criminal proceedings were lodged
— the Supreme Court held that the Commissioner ought to have considered
the application and passed orders expeditiously.
Shares under Sales Corp.
vs. CIT 188 ITR 42 (SC). Similar view was also taken in the case
of Jaikishan Gopikishan Sons vs. CIT 178 ITR 481 (M.P.).
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Waiver of other penalties
Sub-section (4) of section
273A confers further powers on the Commissioner to reduce or waive
any penalty payable under the Act. This power is to be exercised
pursuant to an application made by the assessee. Under this sub-section
the Commissioner has the power to reduce or waive any penalty
payable by the assessee or stay or compound any proceedings for
the recovery of any such amount.
However, the Chief Commissioner’s
approval is required where the aggregate amount of penalties exceeds
Rs. 1,00,000/-.
The assessee has however
to show genuine hardship and the Commissioner has to be satisfied
that to do otherwise than granting waiver or reduction would cause
genuine hardship to the assessee. This is a precondition which
does not exist for section 273A(1) where hardship is not required
to be established. It has been held that where hardship has not
been demonstrated to exist the Commissioner of Income-tax would
be entitled to reject the application – Jyoti Steels vs. CIT
166 ITR 558 (All) Natwarlal Joliram Roul 115 CTR 518 (Bom).
This power of waiver thus
extends to all other penalties besides penalty for concealment
but it does not extend to waiver or stay of recovery of interest.
There is no stipulation in this sub-section that a waiver application
is to be made only once by any assessee as is stipulated for waiver
application for concealment as contained in sub-section (3) of
section 273A. The other condition to be satisfied by the assessee
is that he has to show that he has co-operated in any enquiry
relating to the assessment or any proceeding for the recovery
of any amount due from him. There is no such stipulation that
he has to make the payment of any taxes due from him or make satisfactory
arrangements as mandated in sub-section (1) of section 273A.
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Application relating to Asst.
Years 1988-89 or earlier years
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Sub-section (6) of Section
273A contains a savings clause that the section 273 A as it
stood prior to its amendment by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1989 shall apply in relation to any assessment for the
assessment year commencing on 1st April, 1988 or any
earlier year.
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Sub-section (7) however provides
that even if the application pertains to the earlier years
the previous approval that was required to be taken by Board
would now be taken by the Chief Commissioner or Director General
as the case may be.
- Comments
It has been observed in the course
of dealing with the Department that in cases of search and seizure
Investigating Officers induce the assessee to make high pitched
declarations even beyond what the assessee may have actually earned
by holding out a promise of waiver of penalties, interest and
prosecution and a swift end to the proceedings.
The assessee makes these declarations
to avoid harassment and with a view to buy peace which however
remains elusive and most often gets disturbed by imposition of
penalties and launching of prosecution. The Department’s stand
in such cases is usually that the disclosure or declaration is
not voluntary and not prior to detection and hence no waiver can
be granted. The assessee tries to retract the declaration on the
grounds of pressure and coercion but the appellate authorities
are loathe to accept such retractions as they are usually made
after the investigation team has completed its job for during
that period the assessee fears that the harassment and pressure
would continue. For a brief period of time there was a provision
under the omitted Explanation 2 of sub-section (1) of section
273A which was on the statute from
1-10-1984 to 24-5-1985 that if a person makes a full and true
disclosure of income within 15 days of a search and seizure action
then he would have been deemed to have made a full and true disclosure
prior to detection. Hence the present scenario is that the department
and the assessee are not able to settle tax disputes and litigation
is increasingly clogging the courts.
Even in genuine and bonafide
cases of application made in good faith the Commissioners of Income-tax
do not exercise the power to waive. The petition for waiver lingers
on for years. It is recommended that there must be a time limit
for disposal of such application as they are known to remain undisposed
of for a decade and more.
Once an application has been
made and in the interim before disposal there should be a provision
to stay the recovery of penalty under section 273A(1).
The establishment of the Settlement
Commission and introduction of Chapter XIXA with effect from 1-4-1976
has also not proved to be an efficacious system of bringing about
settlements. This is more so with the Supreme Court holding in
the case of Hindustan Bulk Carriers 126 Taxman 321 (SC)
that interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C cannot be waived
by the Settlement Commission and the view of the Settlement Commission
based on this decision that such interest must continue to be
charged up to the date of final settlement order under section
245D(4).
Further, with the non-application
of the Block Assessment procedure and non application of Chapter
XIVB after 31st May, 2003, there exists no opportunity for an
assessee to come forward and get amnesty by making a full and
true disclosure after a search and seizure action.
With the present economic upswing
and increasingly optimistic global outlook the Income-tax department
must let go off past hostilities and provide a rapprochement machinery
for assessees who have made mistakes but want to come clean. Section
273A is a simple machinery for settlement which has not been used
effectively and has not offered the reprieve that it was intended
to provide.
Section 273b – General
Provision relating to mens rea
Section 273B is a general provision
which was inserted with effect from 10-9-1986 which provides that
in respect of the host of penal provisions referred to in this section,
no penalty shall be imposable for the defaults mentioned therein if
the assessee proves that there was reasonable cause for the failure.
The burden is on the assessee to
show that there was reasonable cause for failure. However, if the
assessee is able to establish reasonable cause, no penalty would be
exigible.
The penalty for concealment imposable
under sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of section 271 is a notable exception.
But it is to be noted that under the Explanation I to that section
the assessee has the right to tender an explanation that all the facts
relating to his income have been disclosed and shown to be bonafide
would exonerate him from the imposition of such penalty. The explanation
of reasonable cause should receive a liberal construction as held
in the case of Vedabai vs. Shantaram Patil 253 ITR 798 (SC).
Section 274
Section 274 embodies the procedure
stipulated for hearing in penalty cases. It encompasses the impatent
principle of audi alteram partem and provides that no order imposing
a penalty shall be made unless the assessee has been heard or a reasonable
opportunity of being heard has been given.
Sub-section (2) provides the limits
of the pecuniary jurisdiction for the various officers.
The words reasonable opportunity
of being heard would encompass the entire gamut of the principles
of fair play from the length of the notice given to disclosure of
adverse material and an opportunity to submit
evidence.
Sec. 275 - Bar of limitation for
imposing penalties
Sec. 275 lays down
the time limit for passing any order of penalty under Chapter XXI
of the Income-tax Act.
Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1)
provides for the time limit in a case where the Assessment order or
any order which gives rise to the penalty is the subject matter of
an appeal either to the Commissioner (Appeals) under Sec. 246 or Sec.
246A or is the subject matter of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal
under Section 253. In such cases where the assessee has challenged
the basic order, the penalty order has to be passed before the expiry
of the financial year in which the proceedings wherein the penalty
is initiated are completed
OR
before the expiry of six months
from the end of the month in which the Appellate Order is received
by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner whichever period expires
later.
In most cases the time limit
gets extended where appeals are pending against the order where penalty
proceedings are initiated except in cases where appeals are disposed
of in the first five months of the Assessment Order or other order
being passed which is very unlikely. However, as seen above, the time
limit gets extended upto six months beyond the disposal of the appeal
by the ITAT. The assessee has to request the Assessing Officer to
keep the penalty proceedings in abeyance until the decision in the
quantum appeal since the time limit is extended by the statute.
However, the proviso to sub-sec.(1)
of Sec. 275 which was introduced by Finance Act 2003 w.e.f. 1-6-2003
amends the provision with respect to penalties proposed to be imposed
in which the assessment or initiation has been challenged and the
CIT(A) has passed an order after 1st June 2003. In such cases the
time limit is as provided in the proviso which is one year from the
end of the financial year in which the assessment order or other order
has been passed
OR
one year from the end of the
financial year in which the order of CIT(A) is received by the Chief
Commissioner of Commissioner whichever is later.
Thus there is a significant
change. In cases where CIT(A) orders have been passed after 1st June
2003, the time limit for passing penalty orders does not get extended
beyond the disposal of the second appeal by the Appellate Tribunal.
Thus the Assessing Officer will have to go ahead and pass the penalty
order after the disposal of the 1st appeal within one year from the
end of the financial year. Thus if the CIT(A) has not given relief
in the quantum appeal there is no scope for waiting for the second
appeal to be disposed of.
Under sub-clause (b), the time
limit for passing an order of penalty where there is revision by the
Commissioner under Section 263 is six months from the end of the month
in which the Order of Revision is passed.
Sub-clause (b) has been amended
with effect from 1-6-2003 to include Order of Revision under Section
264. Thus presently, if the assessee has applied for revision under
Section 264, the time limit gets extended to six months from the end
of the month in which the Revision Order under Section 264 is passed.
Sub-clause (c) provides the
time limit for a case where the order initiating the penalty has been
passed but not challenged in appeal by the assessee. In such a case
the time limit for passing the penalty order is before the expiry
of the financial year in which the order is passed or six months
from the date of initiation of penalty proceedings whichever expires
later.
Sub-section (2) of Section
275 clarifies that the provisions of Sec. 275 as they stood immediately
before the amendment by the Direct Tax Laws (Amended) Act, shall apply
to any action initiated for penalty prior to 31st March 1989.
Explanation below sub-sec.
2 of Sec. 275 excludes certain provisions from the computation of
the period of limitation.
(i) Time taken to give an opportunity
to the assessee of being heard under proviso to Section 129. This
applies when the case is continued by a successor before the predecessor
income-tax authority could complete this case and the assessee demands
to be heard.
Sub-clause (ii) of the Explanation
directs the exclusion of the period during which an applicant to the
Settlement Commission enjoys immunity from imposition of penalty under
sub-sec (1A) and (2) of sub-sec. 245H are spelt out the circumstances
in which immunity can be withdrawn on the assessee failing to comply
with certain conditions. In such cases the penalty can be imposed
but the time limit for imposition logically gets extended.
Sub-clause (iii) of the Explanation
excludes the period during which there is an order or injunction by
the Court staying the proceedings for levy of penalty.
